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Abstract
This paper develops an economic theory of cross-border two-way trade in electric-
ity in which regulated electric utilities engage in proﬁtable trading opportunities
when they have suﬃcient reserve capacity. Electricity demand is stochastic. Two-
way trade emerges in similarity to models of ‘reciprocal dumping.’ Whereas in
those models ﬁrms engage in rent-seeking reciprocal market access, in the present
model electric utilities simply exploit cost variations in order to enhance eco-
nomic eﬃciency through ‘reciprocal load smoothing.’ After deriving estimating
equations, the model is tested with cross-border trade data, exports from Cana-
dian provinces to U.S. states. The empirical tests strongly support the theoretical
model. Reciprocal load smoothing provides an economically signiﬁcant rationale
for integrating North America’s fragmented interconnections into a continental
‘supergrid.’
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Cross-border trade in electricity is not quite like international trade in other
commodities. Electricity is traded mostly over relatively short distances with
neighbouring jurisdictions within an integrated electrical transmission grid. Elec-
tricity trade across borders is also two-way in many instances. A jurisdiction may
import and export electricity over the course of a year, a single day, or even at the
same time if there are multiple transmission lines (interties) across a border. The
peculiarities of electricity generation and transmission limit the applicability of
conventional trade models. There is little scope for Ricardian comparative advan-
tages based on technology diﬀerences. There is a limited scope for neoclassical
comparative advantage based on factor endowments for hydroelectric power and
other renewable energy sources. Modern trade theories based on product diﬀeren-
tiation do not apply because electricity is a homogenous good. A new theoretical
model is needed that can account for the reality of two-way cross-border trade in
electricity. This paper develops such a model and puts it to the test empirically
using electricity exports from Canadian provinces to US states.
International trade in electricity is miniscule by the standard of overall trade
in good services. In 2011, exports of electricity amounted to barely forty billion
US Dollars (and 662 TWh), only about 0.225% of the nearly eighteen trillion US
Dollars of worldwide trade. In that year only 87 nations reported positive exports
or imports. Yet trade in electricity has become vital for many countries, and as
ﬁgure 1 shows, in the last decade electricity trade has quadrupled.
Figure 1: Total World Exports of Electricity
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
[
U
S
$
 
b
i
l
l
o
n
s
]
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Source: UN Comtrade, HS 271600.
Unlike other commodities, elec-
tricity cannot be stored; supply must
meet demand instantaneously.2 As a
result, self-reliant jurisdictions need
to maintain suﬃcient reserve gener-
ation capacity to meet peaks in ﬂuc-
tuating demand. International trade
opens up opportunities to reduce ex-
cessive reserve capacity as well as
import electricity from neighbouring
countries that have a comparative ad-
2A very small amount of electricity can be stored through hydroelectric reservoir pumping.
Currently, there are no economically viable large-scale technological solutions for storing elec-
tricity.
2vantage in electricity generation due to favourable resource endowments. Tech-
nologically, the main barrier to an increase in international trade in electricity
has been the problem of long-distance power transmission. High-voltage direct
current (HVDC) transmission lines are more economical than alternating current
transmission lines and can also be used for undersea links. Still, HVDC losses
amount to roughly 3.5% per thousand kilometer (about 6% per 1,000 miles), and
constructing new HVDC links remains very expensive. Among the most impor-
tant HVDC links is the 1,362 km (846 miles) Paciﬁc DC Intertie from northern
Oregon to Los Angeles. First completed in 1970, by 2004 it was upgraded to a
capacity of 3.1 GW. Signiﬁcant new construction of HVDC lines is currently un-
der way (particularly in China and Brazil), although very little of the new capacity
crosses country borders.
Electricity generation in most jurisdictions is characterized by self-suﬃciency
mandates and a high level of government control. Because electricity distribu-
tion (although not electricity generation) is a natural monopoly, governments of-
ten exert control over electricity generation and distribution through government
ownership or through other forms of regulation (Everett, 2003). Retail prices for
electricity are set by utility commissions that largely amount to cost-plus mark-
up rules. Experiments with privatization (such as in Britain) primarily focused
on electricity generation and electricity trading, with the implicit goal of pro-
moting market entry of independent power producers (IPPs) that would compete
with the established utilities (Rothwell and G´ omez, 2003). The economics of
power markets has attracted considerable attention due to the inherent complex-
ities of electricity generation and transmission (Stoft, 2002; Harris, 2006). Be-
cause of government-mandated self-suﬃciency, trade in electricity across juris-
dictional boundaries (both subnational and national) is mostly an afterthought,
albeit a very proﬁtable one. For trade economists, it is easy to identify excessive
self-suﬃciency as autarkic ineﬃciency.
This paper approaches the issue of cross-border trade in electricity both the-
oretically and empirically. To the best of my knowledge, mine is the ﬁrst paper
to tackle this issue in a rigorous trade-theoretical context by introducing a new
model of two-way international trade.
The empirical reality of trade in electricity exhibits a pattern of two-way trade.
Two-way trade is well understood within the context of product diﬀerentiation,
where love-of-variety preferences lead to intra-industry trade where countries si-
multaneously import and export similar (although not identical) goods. By com-
parison, trade in a classical or neoclassical model is inter-industry—and thus one-
way. While factor endowments clearly plays a role in determining comparative
3advantage for electricity generation, the neoclassical model alone cannot account
for the empirical reality of two-way trade. A new model is needed that can en-
compass both one-way and two-way trade in electricity.
The theoretical section of this paper adapts the Brander (1981) and Brander
and Krugman (1983) model of ‘reciprocal dumping’ to the context of eﬃciency-
seeking trade in electricity. In addition to conventional comparative advantage, a
key driver of trade in electricity is the stochastic variation in electricity demand
across jurisdiction coupled with the (often strong) convexity of electricity gener-
ation cost. Under fairly general conditions, jurisdictions will engage in two-way
trade in electricity. Unlike Brander (1981), the reason for this two-way trade is
notstrategicandrent-seekingbecauseretailpricesareregulated. Instead, two-way
trade is primarily eﬃciency-seeking through ‘reciprocal load smoothing.’
Understanding the rationale for electricity trade informs the quantiﬁcation of
the possible gains from trade. How (in)eﬃcient is today’s trade regime? What is
the potential for additional gains from trade if the North American electric grid
was fully integrated? Indeed, a well-known source of ineﬃciency is the regional
separation of electricity grids in North America, illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
Figure 2: North American Electricity Grid
Source: North American Electric Reliability Cor-
poration
Transmission of bulk electricity
in North America is managed by
the North American Electric Relia-
bility Corporation (NERC) and in
the United States is regulated by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC). NERC’s standards and
policies apply throughout the United
States and Canada. There is in
fact no continent-wide grid. In-
stead, there are several interconnec-
tions (i.e., wide area synchronous
grids) that operate mostly separate
from each other. The two most im-
portant are the Western Interconnection and the Eastern Interconnection. The
other three interconnections serving Quebec, Alaska, and Texas are smaller in
size. There are also nine NERC regional reliability councils that coordinate activ-
ities in their corresponding regions. Transmitting power between interconnections
is technically challenging, precluding trade among neighbouring jurisdictions and
hampering long-distance east-west trading opportunities. To trade economists,
North America’s power grid looks like free trade areas separated by tariﬀ walls.
4The empirical analysis in this paper makes use of export data from Cana-
dian provinces to US states. The geographic west-east alignment of Canadian
provinces along the US border allows for trade with neighbouring provinces as
well as trade with many (not merely neighbouring) US states. Suﬃciently disag-
gregated data is available at the monthly level, allowing for the identiﬁcation of
seasonal patterns in electricity trade. There is a limited number of cross-border
trading pairs. Among the ten Canadian provinces and 49 landlocked US states
(plus DC), there are 500 potential trading pairs. However, there are only 75 ac-
tual trading pairs—or 15% of the potential. The extensive margin dominates the
trading patterns.
2. Empirical Patterns of Trade in Electricity
Table 1 shows average annual generation and demand of electricity in the
ten Canadian provinces and three territories. In most provinces, output and de-
mand match closely. Most provincial utilities operate under a mandate of self-
suﬃciency. A few provinces export a signiﬁcant amount of electricity to neigh-
bouring provinces. For example, the province of Newfoundland and Labrador
exports most of its electricity to neighbouring Quebec.3
Table 2 provides simple correlation statistics for electricity demand in the ten
provinces (aligned geographically from west to east). In some instances, demand
correlation between neighbouring provinces is relatively high and exceeds 0.8.
Interestingly, the correlation between two pairs of large provinces are modest:
demand in Alberta and British Columbia is correlated at 0.37, and demand in On-
tario and Quebec is correlated at 0.43. The point to take away is that correlations
are far less than perfect, and this opens up a source for gains from trade.
Table 3 extends the correlation analysis to the pairs of eight provinces and 32
US states that are engaged in cross-border electricity trade. Actual trading part-
ners are highlighted in boldface, while hypothetical trading partners are shown in
italics. Many of the existing trade partners exhibit positively-correlated electric-
ity demand. As the theoretical section will demonstrate later, lower and negative
correlations are associated with a higher potential for trade. In the case of British
Columbia, trade with California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas is par-
ticularly beneﬁcial because of the negative correlations. As is easily seen, many
3The Churchill Falls hydroelectric dam in Labrador, with an installed capacity of 5,428
Megawatt from 11 turbines, delivers electricity to the province of Quebec under a long-term power
purchasing agreement that is a highly favourable to Quebec at today’s prices.
5Table 1: Average Annual Electricity Generation, Consumption, Exports and Imports by Province
(2008-2012)
Province Output Demand Exports Imports
[GWh] [GWh] CA[%] US[%] CA[%] US[%]
Canada 585,173 550,163 8.9 3.1
Alberta 61,163 64,228 0.3 0.3 4.2 1.2
British Columbia 64,649 64,670 3.4 13.0 0.3 15.6
Manitoba 33,962 24,426 4.1 26.8 2.8 1.0
New Brunswick 11,830 14,511 11.0 9.9 30.1 5.5
Newfoundland and Labrador 41,000 11,423 72.2 0.2
Nova Scotia 11,333 11,726 0.1 0.1 1.9 1.6
Northwest Territories 671 671
Nunavut 166 166
Ontario 145,075 132,535 3.9 9.7 2.6 2.7
Prince Edward Island 216 1,197 23.3 86.2
Quebec 193,364 202,835 3.6 10.0 17.1 0.5
Saskatchewan 21,334 21,424 5.2 0.5 4.6 1.5
Yukon 411 411
Note: Output is total generation of electricity in gigawatthours (GWh). Demand is total elec-
tricity available for use with the province in gigawatthours (GWh). Exports are the delivery
of electricity to other provinces (CA) and the United States (US). Imports are the receipts
of electricity from other provinces (CA) and the United States (US). Exports and imports
are expressed in percentages of output and demand, respectively. Source: Statistics Canada
CANSIM Table 127-0003.
Table 2: Correlation of Monthly Provincial Electricity Demand
BC AB SK MB ON QC NB NS PE NL
BC 0.37b 0.58d 0.91d 0.49d 0.91d 0.87d 0.80d 0.42c 0.87d
AB 0.37b 0.58d 0.48d -.05 0.47d 0.13 0.03 0.41c 0.40b
SK 0.58d 0.58d 0.76d 0.07 0.74d 0.51d 0.50d 0.50d 0.64d
MB 0.91d 0.48d 0.76d 0.46c 0.97d 0.84d 0.79d 0.43c 0.86d
ON 0.49d -.05 0.07 0.46c 0.43c 0.59d 0.61d 0.38b 0.32b
QC 0.91d 0.47d 0.74d 0.97d 0.43c 0.86d 0.81d 0.45c 0.91d
NB 0.87d 0.13 0.51d 0.84d 0.59d 0.86d 0.87d 0.39b 0.83d
NS 0.80d 0.03 0.50d 0.79d 0.61d 0.81d 0.87d 0.41c 0.70d
PE 0.42c 0.41c 0.50d 0.43c 0.38b 0.45c 0.39b 0.41c 0.36b
NL 0.87d 0.40b 0.64d 0.86d 0.32b 0.91d 0.83d 0.70d 0.36b
Note: The numbers in the table are Pearson correlation coeﬃcients based on the 60
monthly observations for the 2008-2012 period. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 95%, 99%,
99.9% and 99.99% conﬁdence levels are indicated by superscripts a, b, c, and d, respec-
tively. Source: Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 127-0003.
6Table 3: Correlation of Monthly Electricity Demand, Canadian Exporter Provinces and US Im-
porter States, 2001–2012
AB BC MB NB NS ON QC SK
AK 0.63d 0.84d 0.83d 0.54d 0.62d -.00 0.80d 0.68d
AZ 0.08 -.46d -.45d -.68d -.54d -.12 -.60d -.20a
CA 0.19a -.24b -.30c -.51d -.37d -.01 -.41d -.10
CO 0.47d -.11 0.00 -.43d -.27b -.15 -.21b 0.22b
IA 0.46d 0.04 0.15 -.23b -.09 0.06 -.04 0.27b
ID 0.31c -.04 0.01 -.26b -.14 0.15 -.13 0.09
IL 0.22b -.09 -.02 -.22b -.10 0.34d -.13 0.03
IN 0.29c 0.08 0.14 -.07 0.09 0.39d 0.07 0.15
MA 0.23b 0.05 0.08 -.06 0.11 0.42d 0.05 0.09
MD 0.01 -.05 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.52d 0.05 0.02
ME 0.14 0.22b 0.13 0.19a 0.25b 0.59d 0.23b 0.10
MI 0.07 -.13 -.15 -.22b -.10 0.48d -.16 -.14
MN 0.43d 0.11 0.17a -.17a 0.01 0.20a 0.02 0.23b
MO 0.32d 0.00 0.08 -.20a -.06 0.20a -.06 0.19a
MT 0.45d 0.67d 0.60d 0.37d 0.51d 0.26b 0.54d 0.40d
ND 0.79d 0.61d 0.79d 0.33d 0.39d -.19a 0.63d 0.80d
NE 0.45d -.01 0.14 -.24b -.12 0.03 -.06 0.28c
NH 0.28c 0.19a 0.18a 0.06 0.21a 0.43d 0.20a 0.14
NM 0.40d -.22b -.13 -.54d -.39d -.21a -.34d 0.12
NV 0.12 -.40d -.40d -.64d -.50d -.06 -.55d -.17a
NY 0.08 -.19a -.14 -.22b -.12 0.39d -.21a -.09
OH 0.20a 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.56d 0.10 0.06
OR 0.44d 0.82d 0.74d 0.67d 0.70d 0.41d 0.79d 0.50d
PA 0.36d 0.30c 0.34d 0.14 0.30c 0.40d 0.29c 0.30c
TX 0.15 -.48d -.38d -.64d -.53d -.13 -.55d -.09
UT 0.54d -.00 0.10 -.35d -.20a -.15 -.12 0.28c
VT 0.36d 0.54d 0.49d 0.41d 0.51d 0.67d 0.50d 0.27b
WA 0.59d 0.73d 0.79d 0.56d 0.60d -.00 0.79d 0.72d
WY 0.69d 0.44d 0.58d 0.07 0.21a -.40d 0.38d 0.68d
Note: The numbers in the table are Pearson correlation coeﬃcients based on
monthly demand data for Canadian provinces that export electricity to the
US, and US states that import electricity from Canada. Coeﬃcients in bold-
face are for actual trade partners; all other correlations are shown in italics.
Statistical signiﬁcance at the 95%, 99%, 99.9% and 99.99% conﬁdence lev-
els are indicated by superscripts a, b, c, and d, respectively. Source: Statistics
Canada CANSIM Tables 127-001, 127-0002, and 127-0003; US Energy In-
formation Administration, Electricity Browser.
7pairs with high negative correlations are not engaging in trade—an indication of
unrealized trade potential.
Figure 3 illustrates the time dimension of electricity trade with the example of
British Columbia, which has one 500 kV intertie with the neighbouring province
Alberta, and two 500 kV and two 230 kV interties with Washington state. This
amounts to an export capacity of 3,150 MW to the United States and 1,200 MW
to Alberta. For technical reasons, import capacities are slightly lower. As was
indicated in table 1, British Columbia’s total electricity trade is relatively balanced
with a signiﬁcant amount of imports and exports. On closer inspection, exports
and imports exhibit seasonal patterns. Even over the period of a month, British
Columbia tends to export and import electricity at the same time. This is in part
explained by the fact that there are multiple interties. British Columbia’s available
generation capacity depends on water levels in the reservoirs of its hydroelectric
dams. Thus there is surplus electricity in high-water years. The years 2011 and
2012 exhibited large net exports during the summer months. Electricity trade with
Alberta, shown in ﬁgure 4, contributes relatively little to the overall trade because
of the smaller capacity of the interties. The trading pattern is clearly dominated
by exports, indicating that British Columbia has a strong comparative advantage
in electricity generation with respect to neighbouring Alberta.
Figure 5 shows the volume of bilateral Canada-US trade over the last decade.
Canada runs an electricity surplus with the United States, with US imports of
Canadian electricity about twice the volume of US exports to Canada. Prices
can ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly, as is illustrated in ﬁgure 6. Electricity can trade for
as little as $25 per MWh, and as much as $70 per MWh. Canadian electricity
commands an export price premium. Over the twelve-year period in the diagram,
Canadian electricity exports to the US cost about 20% more than US electricity
exports to Canada (15% volume-weighted, 23% unweighted) despite the apparent
comparative advantage of Canada in electricity production suggested in ﬁgure 5.
Oneofthepeculiaritiesofinternationaltradeinelectricityisthatthepricedoes
not necessarily reﬂect resource abundance in a conventional Heckscher-Ohlin
sense. The price of traded electricity depends as much on long-term compara-
tive advantage as it does on short-term shortages. The result is that electricity—a
homogenous commodity—can be priced rather diﬀerently depending on which
way the electricity ﬂows through an intertie. The ‘law of one price’ does not ap-
ply. Pricing may even reach absurd levels. During the California electricity crisis
in 2000/2001, British Columbia exported electricity to California at peak prices of
around $800/MWh (see also ﬁgures TA-1 and TA-2 in the Technical Appendix).
And in March 2013, Ontario exported electricity to New York and Michigan at
8Figure 3: British Columbia Total Trade in Electricity, 2008-2012
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Figure 4: British Columbia Interprovincial Trade in Electricity, 2008-2012
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9Figure 5: Canada-US Electricity Exports
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Figure 6: Electricity Export & Import Prices
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$–128/MWh: a negative price. Dumping electricity across the border was less
costly than ramping down generators.
Building interties between jurisdictions is expensive. A double-circuit 500 kV
AC line is estimated to cost over $2 million per kilometer (Mason et al., 2012),
with each circuit able to carry a 2,000 MW load. At the end of each line, addi-
tional substations are needed, each costing about $30 million. However, there are
signiﬁcant economies of scale with respect to the length of the line. High-voltage
direct current (HVDC) lines are cheaper for carrying long-distance loads but re-
quire more expensive Line Commutated Converters (LCCs) at the end. Recent
years have seen many innovations into HVDC technology that will make HVDC
technology cheaper and expand its scope of use.4
3. Modeling Trade in Electricity
This section develops a model of an electric utility that is regulated with re-
spect to its domestic operation but is not constrained with respect to earning prof-
its from engaging in cross-border trade in electricity with a neighbouring foreign
jurisdiction. The ﬁrst part develops the equilibrium for the purely domestic opera-
tion. The second part develops a model for two jurisdictions that engage in trade,
and the third part obtains closed-form solutions for the volume of two-way trade.
Further parts explore implications of the two-way trade in electricity.
4Notably, ABB’s hybrid breakers are considered a ‘game changer,’ and the voltage-source
converter (VSC) technology makes it feasible to use HVDC for lower capacity applications in
HVDC ‘light’ systems. The early 20th-century ‘war of the currents’ between alternating current
(favouredbyTeslaandWestinghouse)anddirectcurrent(favouredbyEdisonandGeneralElectric)
may well reappear in a new battle over bulk electricity transmission.
10The model of ‘reciprocal load smoothing’ developed here introduces a novel
type of comparative advantage. However, I will continue to use the term ‘compar-
ative advantage’ to refer to the ﬁxed long-term comparative advantage from factor
endowments in the Heckscher-Ohlin sense, and contrast this with the variable
short-term comparative advantage from load asymmetries between jurisdictions.
3.1. One Jurisdiction
The most signiﬁcant starting point for modeling an electric utility is its cost
function. Power generation is characterized by a least-cost-ﬁrst approach to de-
ploying power plants. Base load utilizes power plants with low marginal cost such
as hydroelectric dams, or nuclear power plants whose output is diﬃcult to ramp
up or down. Peak load utilizes power plants with short ramping times but high
fuel costs. A suﬃciently general cost function for electricity generation is
c(q(t)) = c0 + c1q(t) +
1
2
c2q(t)
2 (1)
Figure 7: Load and Cost Variation
Load
MC
c1
qmin qmax q0 q1 q2
1
This cost function is quadratic in pro-
duction q(t) over time t and obeys the ca-
pacity constraint q(t) ≤ K. Making use of
a quadratic cost function is an essential fea-
ture of the model, illustrated in ﬁgure 7. In
practice, the cost function is not smooth but
a sequence of step functions (Mansur, 2008,
p 373). Nevertheless, a quadratic function
provides a reasonable approximation.
As the load varies between qmin and qmax
along the thick (blue) line in the diagram,
the marginal cost increases as q rises. There
isthusanasymmetryincostchanges. When
the load increases from q0 to q1, the increase in total cost is equal to the hatched
area in the diagram. However, when the load decreases by the same amount from
q0 to q2, the decrease in total cost is equal to the dotted area, which is less than
the hatched area. This directional cost asymmetry is the fundamental driver of the
theoretical model.
The use of a quadratic cost function also allows for applying properties of
the normal distribution. Appendix A provides a brief discussion of the expected
value of linear and quadratic transformations of random variables. The quadratic
11cost function is particularly suited to exploiting this concept to derive analytically
tractable solutions to the utility’s proﬁt maximization problem. Nevertheless, key
results of this paper—in particular for the problem of electricity trade between
two jurisdictions—can also be derived with alternative cost functions. Appendix
D discusses a logarithmic cost function that is based on capacity utilization (q/K).
For delivery of electricity within a single jurisdiction, transmission losses are
assumed as part of the cost function. When considering cross-jurisdictional deliv-
ery of electricity, transmissions costs will be taken into account explicitly.
Demand for electricity is determined long-term and short-term. Average de-
mand ¯ qoverasuﬃcientlylongreferenceperiod(assumedtobeayear)isgoverned
by a linear demand function
¯ q = a − b¯ p (2)
where the utility price ¯ p is set by a utility commission as described below. Many
utilities still opt for a relatively “ﬂat” pricing system, in the simplest case with
a single price. Peak-load pricing, although economically optimal, is only slowly
gaining ground.5 Within the reference period, short-term demand is determined
stochastically as
q(t) ∼ N(¯ q, s
2) (3)
so that over the integration time period [0,T], or equivalently over the probability
distribution of demand f(q) during the time period T, total supply is
Z T
0
q(t)dt = T
Z
f(q)dq = ¯ qT (4)
Having deﬁned revenues and costs, the utility company’s proﬁts over a ﬁscal year
5For example, the province of Ontario now uses time-of-day residential pricing (on-peak, mid-
peak, and oﬀ-peak during weekdays, and oﬀ-peak during weekends) as well as seasonal pricing
(mid-peak and on-peak periods are reversed in summer and winter). Peak-load pricing in Ontario
leads to signiﬁcantly diﬀerent retail rates for electricity. As of May 1, 2013, the prices for oﬀ-peak,
mid-peak, and on-peak were 6.7, 10.4 and 12.4 cents per kWh, respectively. By comparison, the
province of British Columbia uses a two-step system that amounts to de-facto seasonal pricing.
As of April 1, 2013, residential rates are set at 6.90 cents per kWh for the ﬁrst 675 kWh per
month, and at 10.34 cents per kWh for electric power above the threshold. As electricity demand
in British Columbia peaks in the winter due to heating needs, consumers face a higher marginal
price in winter than in summer.
12are given by
π =
Z

pq(t) − c(q(t))

dt (5)
Because of the natural monopoly in electricity distribution, a utility’s proﬁts are
usually constrained in some form (see Bernard and Roland, 1997). A common
form is the ﬁxed mark-up where the retail price ¯ p is set in such a way that the
utility realizes a ﬁxed percentage mark-up η over the reference period. For a
given value of the policy parameter η,
¯ p = (1 + η)
R
c(t)dt
R
q(t)dt
= (1 + η)
"
c0 + c2s2
¯ q
+ c1 + c2¯ q
#
(6)
The utility’s retail price for electricity is a mark-up on marginal cost at average
load (c1+c2¯ q) plus a component for absorbing the ﬁxed cost and the variability of
demand that is caused by the asymmetry in costs that was illustrated in ﬁgure 7.
The retail price increases with the variance s2. More volatile loads are associated
with higher electricity retail prices because of a stronger exposure to the cost
asymmetry. Equations (2) and (6) together characterize the long-term equilibrium.
For a given η, the two equations identify the equilibrium outcome {¯ p, ¯ q}.6
3.2. Two Jurisdictions
Let there be two jurisdictions, home (h) and foreign (f). Where a distinction
between home and foreign needs to be made, corresponding superscripts are used.
At any given time, the home jurisdiction can export a ﬂow of electric power
x(t) to the foreign jurisdiction. A negative x(t) constitutes an import of electric
power. Transporting electricity across jurisdictional boundaries incurs a transmis-
sion cost g|x| that is proportional to the amount (absolute value |x|) of electrical
power transmitted. The parameter g is a function of the distance D between the
jurisdictions.7 It is assumed that the transmission cost is split equally between
6Iftheutilitywouldusepeak-loadpricinginsteadofﬂatpricing, thedemandﬂuctuationswould
be dampened by consumers’ adjustment to the changing prices. This will change the time path for
the actual loads q(t) and reduce its variance s2.
7It may be appealing to model transmission costs in terms of actual electricity losses—
reminiscent of ‘iceberg transportation costs’ in the international trade literature. However, this
approach increases algebraic complexity signiﬁcantly with very little gain in economic insights.
Modeling transmission costs as a linear function of exports or imports is a suitable approximation
of reality. An alternate logarithmic cost function is explored in Appendix D where the transmis-
13exporter and importer.8 Exports and imports are balanced through a market price
p that will ﬂuctuate over time. To manage notation, deﬁne the indicator variable9
δ ≡
(
+1 when exporting and x > 0
−1 when importing and x < 0 (7)
Assume that the utility is unconstrained to maximize proﬁts after satisfying purely
domestic demand as described in the previous section. This means that at any
time, the under-utilized capacity K − q(t) can be used for export. At any given
time, the utility decides whether to import or export electric power. When it ex-
ports electricity, it earns revenue px and incurs an additional cost c(q + x) − c(q).
Providing this additional electricity will incur extra costs that are increasing pro-
gressively because of the quadratic term in (1). When the utility imports elec-
tricity, it buys quantity −x of electricity at price p and saves generation costs
c(q) − c(q − |x|) by moving down on its marginal cost curve. The utility’s export
proﬁt function is therefore given by
π
x = px − [c1 + c2(q + x/2)]x − g|x|/2 ≥ 0 (8)
Time arguments were dropped for expositional simpliﬁcation. Note that g|x| =
δgxremainspositivebothwhenexportingandimporting. Theﬁrst-ordercondition
for a proﬁt maximum implies that
x =
p − c1 − δg/2
c2
− q (9)
subject to the non-negative proﬁt constraint. Applying the ﬁrst-order condition,
the utility will export electricity when the export price exceeds marginal cost, and
import electricity when the import price is lower than marginal cost:
p > c1 + c2q + g/2 export (10)
p < c1 + c2q − g/2 import (11)
sion losses are modeled directly. All of the key results can obtained with the alternate formulation.
8This assumption simpliﬁes exposition without changing the allocation results. Deﬁning who
pays for the transmission, importer, exporter, or both, merely inﬂuences the distribution of proﬁts.
9Alternatively, one may use binary indicators δx ≡ (1 + δ)/2 for exporting and δm ≡ (1 − δ)/2
for importing.
14In equilibrium, exports and imports must be equal and thus it must hold that xh +
xf = 0. Therefore,
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2c
f
2 + ch
1c
f
2 + ch
2c
f
1
ch
2 + c
f
2
+
g
2
      
c
f
2 − ch
2
ch
2 + c
f
2
      
(12)
The equilibrium trading price is proportional to the sum of loads qf + qh. It is
highest when capacity utilization is high in both jurisdictions. The trading price
is a weighted average of marginal cost. The constant part is a weighted arithmetic
average of the linear cost terms c1, with weights determined by the relative share
of the trading partners’ quadratic cost terms. The variable part is a harmonic
average of the quadratic cost terms, multiplied by the combined load. The price
also rises with the transmission cost g, and this cost factor is magniﬁed by the
cross-border diﬀerence in quadratic cost factors.
Equation (12) also explains how two-way trade can occur at a price diﬀerential
between two jurisdictions, where exports in one direction occur at higher prices
on average than exports in the other direction. Consider the case where Home has
little variation in demand (qh) and where Foreign has high variation in demand
(qf). When demand is high in Foreign, Foreign imports electricity from Home at
a high cost. When demand is low in Foreign, Foreign will export electricity to
Home at a low cost. The jurisdiction with the larger variation in demand is at a
trade disadvantage irrespective of underlying comparative advantage.
With the equilibrium price determined, the amount of electricity exported or
imported is
x
h =
(c
f
1 + c
f
2qf) − (ch
1 + ch
2qh) − δg
ch
2 + c
f
2
(13)
The home jurisdiction exports electricity when its marginal cost is lower than
the marginal cost of the foreign jurisdiction. The export or import volume is
diminished by the transmission cost.
Equation (13) identiﬁes trading opportunities for both jurisdictions if marginal
costs are suﬃciently close. If one jurisdiction has a large comparative advantage,
trade will be unidirectional at all times. This can be the case when one jurisdiction
has a particularly cheap source of electric power, such as hydroelectric dams.
If the cost parameters c1 for home and foreign may be suﬃciently close, it is
just the capacity utilization that determines which jurisdiction has a temporary
15comparative advantage. If all cost factors are identical, then
x
h =
qf − qh − δg/c2
2
(14)
In the absence of transmission losses (g = 0), both jurisdictions would simply
split the diﬀerence in the loads so that both would operate at the same level. In
the presence of transmission costs, the volume of trade diminishes in proportion
to g (which depends on distance between the jurisdictions) and the convexity of
the cost function (c2). Trade will only occur when g is suﬃciently small:
g < δ
  (c
f
1 + q
fc
f
2) − (c
h
1 + q
hc
h
2)
   (15)
The diﬀerence in marginal costs must be suﬃciently large to overcome the trans-
mission cost. More trading opportunities exist when (a) home and foreign demand
are wider apart, and when (b) the cost function is more convex. More generally,
the condition for exporting and importing are
Figure 8 illustrates the patterns of trade that emerge from the two inequal-
ities (15) when δ is +1 for exporting and –1 for importing. The vertical axis
depicts the home-foreign diﬀerence of the ﬁxed linear term in the cost function,
c
f
1 − ch
1. This can be considered the baseline comparative advantage. At the top
of the diagram, home has an export advantage. When c
f
1 − ch
1 is large enough,
home will always export (above the blue dashed line). Conversely, when c
f
1 − ch
1
is negative, then home will tend to import, and below a certain threshold (the red
dashed line) it will always import electricity. The horizontal axis depicts the vari-
able component of the comparative advantage that depends on the quadratic term
in the cost function. This part of the comparative advantage is constrained to the
left by c
f
2q
f
min − ch
2qh
max, which occurs when demand in the foreign jurisdiction is
lowest and demand in the home jurisdiction is highest. On the right, this part of
the comparative advantage is constrained by c
f
2q
f
max − ch
2qh
min, which occurs when
demand in the foreign jurisdiction is highest and demand in the home jurisdiction
is lowest. On the left side of the diagram, the foreign jurisdiction gains a compar-
ative advantage, and on the right side of the diagram, the home jurisdiction gains a
comparative advantage. These constraints are shown as vertical dashed lines. The
inequalities (15) appear as downward-sloping 45-degree lines. Above the (up-
per) blue line the home jurisdiction will export electricity (shaded blue area), and
below the (lower) red line the home jurisdiction will import electricity (shaded
red area). The region between the two diagonal lines is a region where no trade
16Figure 8: Electricity Trading Patterns
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17takes place because the gains from trade do not compensate for the transmission
costs. In the diagram the minimum c
f
2q
f
min − ch
2qh
max and maximum c
f
2q
f
max − ch
2qh
min
have been centered around zero for illustration purposes. Depending on the exact
parameters, these expressions could be asymmetric, including all positive or all
negative.
A particular pair of jurisdictions will operate on a horizontal line, for example
the thick green line in the diagram. This particular case illustrates a situation
where the home jurisdiction has a slight ﬁxed-part advantage because c
f
1 > ch
1.
As demand ﬂuctuates, the variable-part advantage moves along the horizontal line
between the minimum at point (a) and maximum at point (d). If demand in the
foreign jurisdiction is high, and this jurisdiction experiences high marginal costs
of production, the home jurisdiction gains an increasing export advantage moving
from point (c) right to point (d). On the other hand, as demand at home is high
and demand abroad is low, the home jurisdiction will shift further to the left,
eventually cross point (b) and start importing electricity. As demand at home
grows further, the home jurisdiction will experience increasing disadvantages as
it moves towards point (a). Between points (b) and (c), engaging in electricity
trade will not be proﬁtable because of the transmission costs.
3.3. The Volume of Two-Way Trade
The discussion of the previous section demonstrates that electricity trade can
be unidirectional or bidirectional over a suﬃciently time period. While at any
given point in time (with a single intertie) electricity can only ﬂow one way, over
the course of a day, month, or year electricity can ﬂow either direction as demand
changes in both jurisdictions. This is particularly the case if demand across both
jurisdictions is not perfectly correlated, for example because of diﬀerent seasonal
patterns. For simplicity of exposition, assume that home and foreign demand are
distributed bivariate normal with correlation coeﬃcient ρ so that
"
qh(t)
qf(t)
#
= N
 "
¯ qh
¯ qf
#
,
"
(sh)2 ρshsf
ρshsf (sf)2
#!
(16)
Making use of the aﬃne transformation formula for multivariate normal dis-
tributions, explained in Appendix B, one obtains:
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Evaluating the truncated normal distribution as described in Appendix C pro-
vides expressions for the total volume of Home’s exports Xh and total volume of
Home’s imports Mh over the reference period. Let ux denote the version of (17)
for exporting when δ = +1, and let um denote the version of (17) for importing
when δ = −1. Integrating over the reference period yields
X
h ≡
Z
xh>0
x
h(t)dt =
"
u
x + v
φ(ux/v)
Φ(ux/v)
#
T (19)
Analogously, Home’s volume of imports is given by
M
h ≡
Z
xh<0
−x
h(t)dt =
"
−u
m + v
φ(um/v)
1 − Φ(um/v)
#
T (20)
The variance expression v2 is of crucial importance for determining the volume of
exports and imports: there is a positive sign in front of v in the case of exporting
and importing. By deﬁnition, φ(·) > 0 and Φ(·) ∈]0,1[, and thus v always has a
positive inﬂuence on Xh and Mh. The larger the variance v2, the more bilateral
trade. The correlation coeﬃcient ρ plays an important role determining the vari-
ance v2. The derivative of v2 with respect to ρ is clearly negative, which implies
that higher correlation diminishes trade. This is a very intuitive—and essential—
feature. If demand is strongly correlated between jurisdictions, they will both ex-
perience high demand and low demand simultaneously, and this leaves little room
for additional trade. However, when demand in both jurisdictions is correlated
negatively, they can beneﬁt from increased trade.
The derivation above gives rise to an expression for the trade intensity, (Xh +
Mh)/Qh, where Qh ≡
R
q(t)dt is total demand. For expositional simplicity, it is
expedient to ignore the transmission costs g so that ux = um. Then
Xh + Mh
Qh =
v
¯ qh
φ(u/v)
Φ(u/v)Φ(−u/v)
(21)
19It is interesting to investigate the case where both jurisdictions are identical (same
cost coeﬃcients, ¯ qh = ¯ qf, and sh = sf). Then u/v = 0 and φ(0)/Φ(0) =
√
2/π.
Hence:
Xh + Mh
Qh
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¯ q
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4
π
(1 − ρ) (22)
The trade intensity increases along with the coeﬃcient of variation τ ≡ s/¯ q and a
decreasing coeﬃcient of demand correlation between the two jurisdictions ρ.
Yet another simpliﬁcation is useful to look at. Consider the case where the
two jurisdictions are diﬀerent in size by a factor of ζ so that ¯ qf = (1 + ζ)¯ qh and
sf = (1+ζ)sh. Both jurisdictions exhibit the same coeﬃcient of variation τ ≡ s/¯ q.
Further assume that their demand is perfectly correlated (ρ = 1). Then
Xh + Mh
Qh
     
ρ=1,f/h=1+ζ
=
ζ
2
τφ(1/τ)
Φ(1/τ)(1 − Φ(1/τ))
≈
ζ
2
(23)
The approximation improves when τ → 0 and holds reasonably well for small
values of τ (e.g., for τ = 1/4 it is 0.5282ζ). When the size diﬀerence between the
jurisdictions decreases towards zero (ζ → 0), the trading opportunity will vanish
completely because of the perfect demand correlation (ρ = 1).
The case where jurisdictions only diﬀer in size creates an opportunity for trade
that is proportional to the size diﬀerence ζ. The economic intuition behind this
result is that the marginal cost accelerator c2 works diﬀerently in the two jurisdic-
tions. Inthelargerjurisdiction, demandvariationsmoveupanddownthemarginal
cost curve “faster” than in the smaller jurisdiction. The larger jurisdiction thus ex-
periences larger cost variations than the smaller jurisdiction.
3.4. Decomposing One-Way and Two-Way Trade
The model introduced in this paper allows both for one-way trade (driven by
comparative advantage in electricity generation) and two-way trade (driven by the
beneﬁts of reciprocal load smoothing). Available trade data aggregates both types
of trade into one ﬁgure. Can they be decomposed?
A conventional measure for measuring the extent of two-way trade is the
Grubel and Lloyd (1971) index
GLt = 1 −
|Xt − Mt|
Xt + Mt
(24)
This means that total trade X + M can be decomposed into one-way trade |X − M|
20and two-way trade (X + M) − |X − M|. Thus the GL index captures the share of
two-trade trade. Using the expressions for exports (19) and imports (20), ignoring
transportation costs g, and deﬁning the ratio θ ≡ |u|/v as the normalized trade
volume, it can be shown that
GL(θ) = 2Φ(θ)
"
1 − θ
1 − Φ(θ)
φ(θ)
#
(25)
Figure 9 visualizes (25). When the trade volume is small relative to the variation
in trade volume, virtually all trade is two-way. A high GL index indicates that
reciprocal load smoothing dominates as the reason for trade. On the other hand,
when comparative advantage dominates and the trade volume is large relative to
its variation, one-way trade dominates and the GL index approaches zero.
Figure 9: Index of Two-Way Electricity Trade
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1 As the share of two-way trade is computed easily through (24) for a given
reference time period, equation (25) provides yet another testable implication of
the reciprocal load smoothing model. It needs to be noted, though, that the pat-
terns of one-way and two-way trade do not remain stable over time. The Techni-
cal Appendix contains ﬁgures that depict the share of two-way trade for Ontario,
British Columbia and Manitoba during 2003-2012. Over that period, Ontario’s
two-way trade with the United States has given way to one-way trade, and British
Columbia’s two-way trade with Alberta has turned into one-way trade.
3.5. Jurisdictional Integration
How much electricity trade would there be if both jurisdictions were fully
integrated? The joint capacity limit is K◦ ≡ Kh + K f, and joint production is
k◦ ≡ kh +kf, Demand is now q◦ ≡ qh +qf with expected value ¯ qh + ¯ qf, and at any
21point in time demand must equal supply: q◦ = k◦. However, the new variance of
demand is (sh)2 + 2ρshsf + (sf)2. As the coeﬃcient of correlation varies between
[−1,+1], the variance is constrained and ranges between (sh − sf)2 at the low end
and (sh + sf)2 at the high end. For simplicity of exposition, the discussion here
will ignore the transmission cost g.
Total cost of the merged utility is determined in such a way that the utility
employs the lower cost resources ﬁrst until it is possible to equate the marginal
cost of the original home and foreign resources. Then it employs both resources
equally until one of the resources is at full capacity. The remaining capacity, at
highest marginal cost, is brought in at the end. The lower and upper thresholds
are
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In the region [q◦
L,q◦
H], the merged marginal costs will be
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which is composed of a weighted arithmetic mean of the linear terms c1 and a har-
monic mean for the quadratic terms c2. When q◦ > q◦
L, total supply and individual
supply (denoted by k) are related through
k
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Implied exports of Home and Foreign are xh = kh − qh and xf = kf − qf. It
is immediately apparent that xh is the same as (13) without the transmission cost.
Exports and imports are thus the same as (19) and (20) without transmission costs.
Therefore, in the absence of other economic frictions, the eﬃcient volume of trade
in electricity under jurisdictional separation is the same as under jurisdictional
integration. This equivalence theorem is fundamental but not unexpected: it is a
property of all neoclassical trade models. Trade brings about full eﬃciency unless
dampened by frictions.
22In practice, jurisdictional integration has two advantages over jurisdictional
separation. First, integration removes the potential conﬂict over building suﬃcient
intertie capacity. Integration eliminates the negotiation and contracting issues that
may arise otherwise. Second, integration also leads to a new price ¯ p, which—as
was shown earlier—is inﬂuenced by the variance of the distribution of q(t). If
demand in both jurisdictions is less than perfectly correlated, integration will lead
to a reduction of the joint variance s2; it will be lower than (sh)2 + (sf)2. This
means that the joint price ¯ p can be lower than the original ¯ ph or ¯ pf (unless the
original price gap was very large). This ‘integration bonus’ is a true eﬃciency
gain.
3.6. Building Interties
When is it proﬁtable for two neighbouring utilities to construct an intertie
connecting their grids? The capital cost building it must be compensated by the
gains from trade. Assume that the amortized capital cost of building an intertie
with capacity I is given by κI, where κ is a cost factor that includes the ﬁnancing
cost, maintenance cost, and need for eventual replacement. Implicitly, κ depends
on the discount rate. It is expressed on a time scale equivalent to T, the reference
time period for evaluating proﬁts. Then an intertie is proﬁtable when
Z
π
x(t)dt > κI (31)
The discussion in the previous section had assumed that the ﬂow of electricity
across jurisdictions is not constrained by the capacity of the intertie. In practice,
the volume of exports and imports may be constrained so that |x| < I.
Evaluating the proﬁtability of a proposed intertie is necessarily a much more
complex decision problem in the network structure of a power grid. Kleit and Re-
itzes (2008) provides an analytic economic framework, and Doucet et al. (2013)
extends that approach and provides an application to a proposed Montana-Alberta
intertie. Encouragingly, they ﬁnd that the gains to transmission expansion are
largely appropriable. Bresestia et al. (2009) shows how a network ﬂow optimiza-
tion model can be utilized to gauge the economic beneﬁts of network expansion,
although such complex optimization models have rather high data requirements.
Church et al. (2009) demonstrates the complexity of a weighing costs and beneﬁts
for a proposed new intertie in Alberta, in particular the sensitivity of the invest-
ment decision to the underlying assumptions.
233.7. Capacity Constraints
Thetheoreticalmodeldevelopedsofardoesnottakeintoconsiderationthatin-
tertie capacity is ﬁxed in the short term. A given intertie has a rated MW capacity
for export (¯ x) and import (¯ m). These two numbers do not have to be identical for a
given intertie because of constraints with transformers and other equipment.10 A
jurisdiction will export or import at maximum intertie capacity when
p > c1 + c2(q + ¯ x/2) + g/2 ≡ c¯ x exporting (32)
p < c1 + c2(q − ¯ m/2) − g/2 ≡ c¯ m importing (33)
When c
f
¯ m < ch
¯ x, the home jurisdiction will export electricity at maximum capacity
¯ xh = ¯ mf. The price must fall in the range c
f
¯ m < p < ch
¯ x; it is not unique and subject
to bargaining. Maximum intertie use for exporting will therefore occur when
c
f
2q
f − c
h
2q
h > c
h
1 − c
f
1 + g + ¯ x
h(c
f
2 + c
h
2)/2 (34)
When foreign and domestic cost factors are the same, then this condition simpli-
ﬁes to qf −qh > ¯ xh+g/c2. Home exports at maximum capacity as soon as the gap
between foreign and domestic load is suﬃciently large.
A related question is about the utilization rate of the intertie. How often will
the intertie operate under full load? It is again possible to employ the equations
for aﬃne transformations in Appendix B. Taking expectations on the left-hand
side of (34) and abbreviating the term on the right-hand side as ˜ c, it follows that
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The probability that the capacity is fully utilized in the export direction is thus
1 − Φ((˜ c − ˜ u)/˜ v). When both jurisdictions are cost-identical and have demand
correlation ρ, the probability of full intertie utilization is
10As a practical example, the Total Transfer Capability (TTC) of the Ingledow-Custer intertie
(two 500 kV lines) between British Columbia and Washington state is rated at 3,150 MW in the
southern direction and 2,000 MW in the norther direction. A ﬁgure in the Technical Appendix
depicts actual utilization hour-by-hour over a few weeks. The frequent reversal of direction is a
deﬁning feature of many interties.
24Prob(x = ¯ x
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When both jurisdictions are symmetric, the probability in the expression above
cannot exceed 50% because imports and exports are symmetric as well. From the
above expression it becomes clear that capacity utilization increases with: a de-
creasing demand correlation (ρ becomes smaller or negative); a decreasing ratio
of intertie capacity to demand variation ¯ xh/s; and decreasing transportation cost
g. Conversely, as ρ → 1, utilization drops to zero. Capacity utilization will in-
crease if the intertie’s use is driven by comparative advantage rather than demand
ﬂuctuations and reciprocal load smoothing. The larger the comparative advantage
|c
f
1 − ch
1|, the more the intertie will be used.
3.8. Multilateral Resistance and Other Caveats
The theoretical model developed in this section is strictly bilateral. How-
ever, in many instances electric utilities are dealing with multiple neighbouring
jurisdictions. This complicates the algebra but leaves the economic intuition un-
changed. The main adjustment involves the aﬃne transformation for a vector of
random variables (electricity demand in multiple jurisdictions). This transforma-
tion generalizes to an arbitrary number of jurisdictions, with a more complicated
variance-covariance matrix.
Gravitymodelsofinternationaltradeallowexplicitlyfortradebarrierstoalter-
native trading partners through inward and outward multilateral resistance (Head
and Mayer, 2014). Something similar applies in a model of multilateral load
smoothing (as opposed to reciprocal load smoothing). Exports to a foreign ju-
risdiction depend not only on the exporter’s and importer’s load, but also on the
available load of all feasible alternate jurisdictions. For electricity trade, this set
of feasible alternatives is limited by available transmission capacity. The empir-
ical analysis would be incomplete without allowing speciﬁcally for the available
capacity from the alternate jurisdictions. This will be taken into account appropri-
ately in the empirical section below.
An important caveat applies to the time dimension. Demand is correlated dif-
ferently at diﬀerent frequencies. The empirics in this paper focuses on monthly
data, which captures demand correlations that are mostly attributable to seasonal
eﬀects. Monthly data cannot capture intra-day eﬀects. Over long east-west dis-
tances, time zone diﬀerences can generate negative correlations even when sea-
sonal eﬀects are the same for two jurisdictions.
254. Estimating Electricity Trade
4.1. Principal Estimating Equation
The theory section of this paper has developed a model of two-way trade in
electricity. Equation (13) predicts instantaneous exports and equation (19) pre-
dicts the volume of exports from Home to Foreign over a reference time period.
The latter equation can be turned into an estimating equation for monthly or an-
nual trade in electricity.
Deriving the estimating equation needs to start with a discussion of the iden-
tiﬁcation strategy. Demand in Home and Foreign have time variation. However,
variance and correlation are derived from demand data and thus have limited or
no time variation, depending on the time horizon for calculating these statistics.
For monthly data, the covariance structure is calculated over the entire available
sample period, and therefore si does not have a time subscript.11 Without time
variation, variance and correlation become a trading-dyad ﬁxed eﬀect. It is there-
fore necessary to use cross-sectional variation to identify the economic eﬀect of
the time-invariant variables, and thus submit the theory to an appropriate test.
In order to make use of cross-sectional variation in the data, it is necessary to
impose a crucial identiﬁcation assumption. The c2 cost parameters will tend to be
diﬀerent for each jurisdiction. In order to estimate the economic eﬀects through
coeﬃcients that are similar for all jurisdictions, one can impose the additional
assumption that ci
2 = ˜ c2/Ki for each jurisdiction i. This means that the quadratic
cost term varies with qi(qi/Ki), the product of actual load and capacity utilization.
Then ˜ c2 can be assumed to be similar across jurisdictions. With this modiﬁcation,
one can derive the export-to-capacity ratio
xh
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qh
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where K fh ≡ 2K fKh/(K f +Kh) is the harmonic average of the generation capacity
in both jurisdictions. This identifying assumption also simpliﬁes the variance term
11Correlation patterns may be diﬀerent at diﬀerent frequencies. The Technical Appendix con-
tains ﬁgures that illustrate load patterns at the hourly, week-daily, and seasonal level for British
Columbia. Seasonal correlation accounts for a large chunk of the cross-jurisdictional variation,
whereas week-daily patterns are similar across jurisdictions. Seasonal correlations are inﬂuenced
by the latitude and climate of jurisdictions. Hourly correlations are relatively high in the north-
south direction, but due to time zone shifts drop signiﬁcantly along with east-west separation. At
the extreme, a 12-hour time zone diﬀerence would imply a high negative correlation.
26so that it depends merely on the correlation coeﬃcient ρ and the two normalized
demand standard deviations (si/Ki and sj/Kj).
Econometric estimation of trade models often involves ‘gravity’ models of the
typepioneeredbyAndersonandvanWincoop(2003,2004). AsdiscussedinHead
and Mayer (2014), state-of-the-art estimation techniques typically make use of ex-
tensive dyadic ﬁxed eﬀects, which identify economic eﬀects primarily through the
time variation in the trade data. While this approach is necessary because of the
presence of multilateral resistance eﬀects in the love-of-variety models of trade in
diﬀerentiated products, it is not strictly necessary in the case of estimating equa-
tion (19). Even though the estimating equation has pair-speciﬁc eﬀects, they can
be captured through suitable economic variables. Unlike multilateral resistance,
these pair-speciﬁc eﬀects are generally observable.
Equation (19) is rather nonlinear due to the appearance of the probability den-
sity function and cumulative density function of the normal distribution. It is
therefore noted that ∂X/∂u > 0 and ∂X/∂v > 0. A log-linearized approximation
of equation (19) for exports of electricity from jurisdiction i to jurisdiction j in
time period t is given by
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where parameters α1 through α4 are all positive to be consistent with the theoreti-
cal model.
The parameter µij captures the comparative advantage diﬀerential in the c1
parameters and can thus be either positive or negative. The parameter α3 captures
the eﬀect of distance D on the trade volume. A time trend (Tt) is added to capture
infrastructure changes over time. The error term is ijt. The normalization of the
dependent variable (expressing it as an export-to-capacity ratio) removes much of
the potential heterogeneity in the error term.
The intercept µij in equation (39) captures, primarily, the comparative advan-
tage of the trading partners. It will be treated in diﬀerent ways. First, it can
simply be treated as a noisy intercept. Second, it can be treated as a random eﬀect
for each trading pair.12 Third, it can be treated as ﬁxed eﬀects for each exporter
12The usual caveat about trade-oﬀs between eﬃciency and consistency apply; see for example
27and importer (i.e., separate µi and µj). Fourth, µij can be modeled explicitly with
determinants of comparative advantage. Speciﬁcally, comparative advantage can
be approximated by the composition of electricity generation, assuming similar
underlying technologies. The composition of generation capacity by type (hy-
droelectricity, nuclear, coal, natural gas, other fossil fuel, and renewable sources)
can be used to capture the underlying comparative advantage. All four empirical
strategies are pursued, although with diﬀerent level of emphasis, and with some
results relegated to the Technical Appendix.13
Lastly, the bilateral identiﬁcation strategy in equation (39) can be augmented
through a a term that mimics ‘multilateral resistance’ in multilateral models of
trade in diﬀerentiated goods. In some speciﬁcation, a variable is included that is
the capacity-weighted average of load factors of the alternate jurisdictions. In the
absence of intra-US state-level trade data, alternate jurisdictions are identiﬁed as
states within the same interconnection.
4.2. Estimating Trade Intensity and Export Prices
A more indirect method for estimating cross-border trade in electricity focuses
on trade intensity, the ratio of total trade (imports and exports) to demand TI ≡
(X+M)/Q. This ratio was introduced in equation (21) and discussed in simpliﬁed
versions in equations (22) and (23). The key insights from this discussion can be
distilled into an estimating equation for each jurisdiction i in time period t:
TIit = β0 +
J X
j=1
β
j
1
K
j
it
Kit
+ β2 ln(Qi) + β3
S i
Qi
+ β4Tt + it (40)
The J measures K j/K capture the composition of electricity generation for hy-
droelectric, nuclear, and renewable-source power. Trade intensity and all shares
will be expressed as percentages. The regressor ln(Qi) captures the size of the
Greene (2011). Random eﬀects and OLS are able to capture cross-sectional variation, while ﬁxed
eﬀects suppress cross-sectional variation and use longitudinal variation to identify the eﬀect of
regressors.
13There are alternatives to the panel data approach captured by (39). In theory it is possible to
estimate equation (19) directly for a given pair of jurisdictions, and use the trade data to recover the
ﬁve underlying parameters (ch
1, c
f
1, ch
2, c
f
2, and g). In practice this approach is not feasible because
some of the key parameters would need to be available at sub-monthly frequencies. This micro-
level estimation approach is also facing the problem that actual cost curves are not neatly convex.
Actual cost functions experience discrete jumps when generator stations are brought online.
28jurisdiction, and the coeﬃcient of variation S i/Qi captures the demand variability
of a jurisdiction. The two measures S i and Qi are time-averaged over the sample
period. A time trend Tt (time in years before or after 2005.0) is added to capture
infrastructure changes that include grid expansion. Note that changes in compo-
sition are captured by the time variation in K
j
it.
Because states and provinces are of signiﬁcantly diﬀerent economic size, it
is meaningful to weight the regressions accordingly. The reported results will
employ weighted least squares with Qi as weights. Data from the United States
and Canada cannot be pooled. Whereas Canada records electricity imports and
exports directly, the US trade intensity is imputed as the absolute diﬀerence of
demand and supply in a given period. This imputation procedure underestimates
actual electricity trade due to aggregation bias.
A further method for testing the model is through the use of the price equa-
tion (12). Export prices are inﬂuenced positively by increasing load in both ex-
porter and importer jurisdiction. Prices should also increase with distance. Equa-
tion (12) can be estimated linearly, but a log-linear version may be more appro-
priate given that prices often have a long upper tail.
ln(pijt) = γ0 + µi + µj + γ1Tt + γ2 ln
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There are indicator variables µi and µj for all exporters and importers, with one
exporter and one importer jurisdiction each excluded as the base. To be consistent
with theory, the estimates of γ2, γ3, and γ4 all have to be positive.
4.3. Data
For all data sources, trade in electricity is deﬁned as Harmonized System (HS)
commodity code 271600. The main source of bilateral monthly trade between
Canadian provinces and US states is the Canadian International Merchandise
Trade database (CIMT) maintained by Statistics Canada. This database records
exports from individual Canadian provinces to individual US states, although im-
portsintoCanadianprovincesareonlyaccountedforinaggregateforallUSstates.
The CIMT database records trade data since 1988.
Electricity demand and generation as well as inter-provincial trade in electric-
ityhasbeenobtainedfromStatisticsCanada’sCANSIMdatabase. Thetablesused
include 172-0003 (electric power generation, receipts, deliveries and availability
of electricity, monthly from January 2008 onward) and 127-0008 (corresponding
annual data). Proﬁles of electricity generation by type are available in tables 127-
290002 (monthly) and 127-0007 (annual). Table 127-0001 (terminated) contains
monthly electric power statistics from 1950 through 2007. The data reported in
these tables originates with Canada’s National Energy Board.
Additional international trade in electricity data was obtained from the United
Nations COMTRADE database. This database records both volume and value of
exports and imports, going back to 1988.14
State-level electricity data in the United States are available from the Electric-
ity Data Browser of the U.S. Energy Information Administration. State-level data
are estimated and aggregated from reporting utilities and power generation facil-
ities. Monthly data are available from January 2001 onwards. Available tables
cover generation, consumption, but unfortunately not inter-state deliveries.
Distances between jurisdictions were calculated as population-weighted har-
monic averages based on populations and geographic locations of postal codes
(United States: ZIP codes; Canada: FSA codes). The Technical Appendix con-
tains a table for distances between Canadian provinces and US states.
5. Results
5.1. Testing the Two-Way Model of Electricity Trade
The results for the principal estimating equation are shown in table 4. The
selected sample in the three columns involve three Canadian provinces (British
Columbia [BC], Ontario [ON], and Manitoba [MB]) exporting electricity to US
importer states. The three provinces were selected because they exhibit signiﬁ-
cant levels of two-way trade. Other provinces have little trade or are subject to re-
exporting. For example, the province of Quebec exports large quantities of elec-
tricity generated outside its boundaries in Labrador. Including such re-exporters
confounds the empirical analysis.
The ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in table 4 capture about a third
of the overall variation in the data. The estimates clearly support the theory: all
signs are estimated exactly as expected. An increased load ratio in the importing
14Datapriorto2000appearsratherspotty, andtheremaybeseriousdataqualityissues. Whereas
thevaluedataappearstobemostlyreliable, thevolumeinformationisofteninternallyinconsistent.
This means that exports reported by an origin country to a destination country are rather diﬀerent
than imports reported by the destination country from the origin country. While in some cases this
seems to be a misreported physical units problem (MWh instead of GWh), in other cases there
seem to be systematic problems. The volume data in the The COMTRADE database should only
be used with considerable caution.
30Table 4: Regression Analysis of Exports from Canadian Provinces to US States
Export Province BC ON MB
Intercept 0.189 (.453) 1.610 (.790) 5.950a (2.07)
Importer Load Ratio ln(qj/Kj) 0.892c (6.60) 2.460c (6.34) 1.719b (3.18)
Exporter Load Ratio ln(qi/Ki) −0.948a (2.40) −3.246c (3.72) −1.736c (6.07)
Transmission Distance ln(Dij) −2.034c (25.6) −2.700c (11.4) −4.876b (3.09)
Demand Variability ln(Vij) 0.855c (7.25) 1.196 (1.69)
Time trend −0.001 (.061) 0.062a (1.97) 0.032a (2.32)
Observations 1,443 799 138
R2 0.358 0.274 0.276
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% conﬁdence levels are indicated by su-
perscripts a, b, c, respectively. Standard scores (unsigned z-values) are shown in parentheses. De-
pendent variable is ln(Xijt/Kij), the log ratio of electricity exports relative to the bilateral harmonic
mean of generating capacity.
jurisdiction raises exports, as does a decreased load ratio in the exporting jurisdic-
tion. The demand variability variable has the expected positive eﬀect, although
this eﬀect is not always statistically signiﬁcant (Ontario) or is not deﬁned (Mani-
toba) because of an insuﬃcient number of trading partners.15
Distance has the expected negative eﬀect, but the magnitude is quite remark-
able. The distance elasticity is at least −2 and in one case nearly −5. By compari-
son, gravity models of merchandise trade estimate the distance elasticity at around
−1. Making sense of the observed distance eﬀect is a challenge. Line losses alone
cannot possibly (even at large distances) account for the large magnitude of the
estimated coeﬃcient. A plausible explanation is that physical distance approxi-
mates jurisdictional distance. Crossing more and more jurisdictions (provinces,
states, municipalities) impedes the feasibility of building transmission capacity
considerably, even though right-of-way costs only account for about 10% of total
project costs (Mason et al., 2012, p. 2-6). The potential for NIMBY-type opposi-
tion increases with increasing length when beneﬁts from a new transmission line
accrue in distant locations. Fully accounting for the sources of the large distance
eﬀect should be the aim of future research. As the inclusion of the ‘multilateral
15The variability measure captures seasonal eﬀects that require long time periods for identiﬁca-
tion. The estimating equation mixes short-term eﬀects (load factor) and long-term factors (demand
variability). The within-month variability is unobservable given the constraints of the data set.
31resistance’ term in the third column in table 6 documents, the large distance eﬀect
is not merely an artifact that results from neglecting the multilateral dimension of
electricity trade.
Tables 5 and 6 provide further analyses of the estimating equation. Table 5
provides simple estimates of the comparative advantage for all trading pairs and
separately for British Columbia (BC) and Ontario (ON). The distance elasticities
are again around −2. Comparative advantages are captured by proxies for the
composition of generating capacity, for both exporters and importers in the ﬁrst
column, and only for the importer for the second and third column that cover
a single exporter jurisdiction. These estimated eﬀects tend to be signiﬁcant in
the ‘all’ and ‘BC’ columns. The estimated exporter advantage for hydroelectric
power makes immediate sense, although the negative eﬀect for nuclear power
less so. Only Ontario has a signiﬁcant amount of nuclear capacity, and thus the
eﬀect may simply capture an Ontario-speciﬁc eﬀect. On the importer side, the
excludedcategoryforgenerationcapacityisoil-basedpowerplants(typicallywith
high marginal costs). All the importer composition eﬀects are positive in the
ﬁrst two columns. It makes sense that a higher proportion of renewable energy
would promote a higher level of electricity imports because of the intermittency
of renewable sources. In the case of coal, the eﬀect is negative for Ontario and
positive for British Columbia.
Table 6 explores an integrated framework with regressors for comparative ad-
vantage and reciprocal load smoothing. The ﬁrst column employs the generation
composition variables as proxies for comparative advantage, while the second
column uses a full set of exporter and importer indicator variables similar to es-
timating equation (41). The third column adds a ‘multilateral resistance’ control
variable as deﬁned earlier (as jurisdiction ﬁxed eﬀects do not capture time vari-
ation in loads of alternate jurisdictions). The eﬀect from the load ratios of the
exporter and importer are fully consistent with the theory, as is the distance esti-
mate. The demand variability regressor is positive but not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst
and third columns, and negative and signiﬁcant in the second column. The latter is
not consistent with the theory. However, unlike Dij, the variation in Vij can be cap-
tured nearly perfectly with the exporter and importer dummy variables, and thus
multicollinearity may interfere with estimating Vij correctly in the second column.
The introduction of the ‘multilateral resistance’ term for the average load ratio of
alternate import sources strengthens the eﬀect from the exporter and importer load
ratios, and itself is negative. This means that alternate electricity sources compete
with the exporter region, just as one might expect in a multilateral setting. The
Technical Appendix reports additional estimates that employ random eﬀects for
32Table 5: Comparative Advantage and Canada-US Electricity Trade
Export Province All BC ON
Intercept −6.495c (8.49) −14.23c (9.53) 0.671 (.337)
Transmission Distance ln(Dij) −2.213c (36.6) −2.157c (17.6) −1.789c (11.0)
Importer coal share % 0.039c (5.01) 0.116c (8.56) −0.054b (2.61)
Importer natural gas share % 0.054c (6.26) 0.144c (9.65) −0.041 (1.84)
Importer hydro share % 0.028c (3.68) 0.112c (7.57) 0.003 (.130)
Importer nuclear share % 0.070c (9.03) 0.174c (13.0) −0.032 (1.59)
Importer renewables share % 0.104c (10.9) 0.193c (13.7) 0.041 (1.39)
Exporter hydro share % 0.008c (6.48)
Exporter nuclear share % −0.011c (5.11)
Exporter renewables share % −0.000 (.839)
Time trend −0.023a (2.07) −0.024 (1.69) 0.100c (3.86)
Observations 3,482 1,443 799
R2 0.533 0.511 0.384
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% conﬁdence levels are indicated by super-
scripts a, b, c, respectively. Standard scores (unsigned z-values) are shown in parentheses.
Table 6: Full Trade Model
Export Province All All All
Intercept −5.240c (6.11) −8.589c (4.25) −4.947c (5.74)
Importer Load Ratio ln(qj/Kj) 0.767c (7.19) 1.345c (6.08) 0.806c (7.52)
Exporter Load Ratio ln(qi/Ki) −2.978c (15.3) −0.779c (4.22) −3.053c (15.6)
Alternates Load Ratio ln(q−/K−) −0.833b (3.16)
Transmission Distance ln(Dij) −2.240c (36.9) −1.911c (13.5) −2.241c (37.0)
Demand Variability ln(Vij) 0.161 (1.55) −3.224c (4.04) 0.061 (.560)
Importer coal share % 0.029c (3.82) 0.021a (2.54)
Importer natural gas share % 0.040c (4.75) 0.033c (3.70)
Importer hydro share % 0.019a (2.53) 0.009 (1.14)
Importer nuclear share % 0.060c (7.74) 0.052c (6.33)
Importer renewables share % 0.082c (8.19) 0.070c (6.57)
Exporter hydro share % 0.005c (3.70) 0.005c (3.50)
Exporter nuclear share % −0.015c (6.05) −0.015c (6.22)
Exporter renewables share % −0.000c (3.58) −0.000c (3.85)
Time trend −0.004 (.400) 0.023b (3.01) 0.009 (.772)
Observations 3,482 3,482 3,482
Exporter & Importer F.E. no yes no
R2 0.570 0.737 0.571
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% conﬁdence levels are indicated by superscripts
a, b, c, respectively. Standard scores (unsigned z-values) are shown in parentheses.
33the full panel. Qualitatively, the results are highly similar to those reported here.
5.2. The Extensive Margin of Trade
Cross-border trade in electricity exhibits diﬀerent extensive margins. First is
the margin of exporting and importing on a jurisdictional level: which province-
state dyads trade, and which do not. This type of margin is quite dominant as each
exporting province only has a relatively small number of import partners in the
United States. A logistic regression was used to explore the ﬁrst type of margin.
The results are reported in the Technical Appendix because they shed little addi-
tional light on cross-border trade in electricity. This analysis looks at all possible
trading dyads (all provinces times all states); only about 5% of them trade. This
analysis is purely cross-sectional and does not include a time dimension. Only the
distance eﬀect is estimated signiﬁcantly along with a negative eﬀect from a higher
share or renewables in the exporter jurisdiction. As can be expected, distance and
availability of transmission infrastructure determine trading capability. The sep-
aration into diﬀerent interconnections is, of course, a nearly perfect predictor of
who can trade with whom.
Another type of margin is within the group of trading dyads. Some dyads
do not always trade. There may be signiﬁcant periods of zero trade for a given
trading pair. These may indicate periods when trading is not proﬁtable despite
the fact that transmission capacity exists. This type of extensive margin is related
to economic rather than physical constraints. This type of margin is consistent
with two-way trade in electricity and the no-trade gap in ﬁgure 8. However, this
margin is diﬃcult to identify in monthly data. Aggregation may obscure what may
be episodes of zero trade throughout a month. If trade is more one-way (driven
by comparative advantage) than two-way (driven by reciprocal load smoothing),
transmission capacity will also tend to be more utilized.
5.3. Trade Intensity
The theory of reciprocal load smoothing can also be tested through estimating
equation (40) for trade intensity. Tables 7 and 8 report the results of this approach
for Canada and the United States, respectively. Because of the vastly diﬀerent
size of jurisdictions (especially in Canada), weighted least squares were used to
obtain estimates, with average jurisdictional demand as the weight. The ﬁrst col-
umn in both tables includes all jurisdictions. As a robustness check, the second
column suppresses observations with trade intensities in excess of 120%, which
is indicative of jurisdictions that produce electricity primarily for export. The
third column suppresses observations where the trade intensity is zero (Canada)
34or miniscule (United States, less than 1%). The panel used in both instances com-
prises all jurisdictions in Canada and the United States and monthly data since
2001.
Table 7: Trade Intensity Regressions—Canada
Sample Selection All TI<120% TI>0%
Estimation Method WLS WLS WLS
Intercept 112.24c (15.2) 41.468c (17.0) 121.41c (14.5)
Share of Hydro % 0.495c (15.6) 0.254c (24.5) 0.513c (14.4)
Share of Nuclear % 0.344c (9.01) 0.199c (16.1) 0.355c (8.34)
Share of Renewables % 0.000 (1.17) 0.001c (7.92) 0.000 (.853)
Demand Coeﬀ. of Var. − 0.591a (2.09) 1.280c (14.1) 0.438 (1.38)
Log Average Demand −13.57c (21.7) −5.808c (27.7) −14.43c (20.3)
Time Trend a−1 0.031 (.235) 0.124b (2.86) 0.028 (.187)
Observations 2,081 1,931 1,629
Weights Avg. Demand Avg. Demand Avg. Demand
R2 0.404 0.697 0.418
Table 8: Trade Intensity Regressions—United States
Sample Selection All TI<120% TI>1%
Estimation Method WLS WLS WLS
Intercept 136.85c (35.6) 65.860c (24.4) 139.25c (35.8)
Share of Hydro % −0.067b (3.07) 0.069c (4.70) −0.071b (3.24)
Share of Nuclear % 0.007 (.346) 0.225c (15.8) −0.003 (.158)
Share of Renewables % 0.256b (2.97) 0.300c (5.12) 0.204a (2.34)
Demand Coeﬀ. of Var. − 1.077c (9.74) 0.779c (10.4) 1.045c (9.29)
Log Average Demand −13.96c (34.5) −6.668c (23.5) −14.05c (34.3)
Time Trend a−1 0.026 (.286) 0.168b (2.69) 0.026 (.281)
Observations 7,344 6,862 7,123
Weights Avg. Demand Avg. Demand Avg. Demand
R2 0.147 0.115 0.149
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% conﬁdence levels are indicated
by superscripts a, b, c, respectively. TI stands for trade intensity. Standard scores (unsigned
z-values) are shown in parentheses.
The estimating equation (40) predicts a positive eﬀect from the coeﬃcient of
variation of electricity demand. The results in tables 7 and 8 conﬁrm this predic-
tion, thus providing another crucial piece of evidence in support of the reciprocal
load smoothing hypothesis. Jurisdictions with more volatile demand are more
eagerly engaging in electricity trade. The results also indicate an interesting size
eﬀect. Larger jurisdictions rely much less on trade than smaller jurisdictions. This
35makes intuitive sense. Larger jurisdictions tend to be more diversiﬁed in terms of
generating capacity and may be better able to balance load in diﬀerent regions.
Smaller jurisdictions need to rely more on their neighbours to compensate for
ﬂuctuating demand, or simply import electricity from their bigger neighbours.
In Canada, jurisdictions with a higher proportion of hydroelectric and nuclear
power tend to increase their trade intensity. This may be an indication of the com-
parative advantage of these technologies, or the higher reliability and availability
for satisfying base loads. In the United States, these two power sources do not
seem to have a large inﬂuence on the trade intensity. However, a larger share of
renewable energy is clearly associated with an increase in electricity trade.
5.4. Export Prices
TheCanadianInternationalMerchandiseTrade(CIMT)databaserecordsboth
volume and value of exports and imports. It is therefore possible to analyze the
price dimension of exports. Summary data appear in the Technical Appendix.
There is signiﬁcant variation in prices along with occasional price spikes such as
those during the 2000-2001 California electricity crisis.16 Price spikes in excess
of $200/MWh were purposefully excluded from the analysis in this section.
Table 9 reports results for the price estimating equation (41), which includes
ﬁxed eﬀects for exporter provinces and importer states. It may be interesting to
look at these numbers as they indicate idiosyncratic price premia and discounts. In
the table the importer states are preﬁxed M, and the exporter provinces ar preﬁxed
X. The base exporter province is Ontario, and the base importer state is New York;
all price premia are relative to this base-pair.
The ﬁrst column in table 9 reports simple OLS estimates. The second col-
umn (QREG) reports results from a quantile regression of the median to allow for
the long tail of the price distribution. The dependent variable in both columns is
expressed in dollars per MWh. The third—and preferred—estimation approach
corresponds directly to the log-linear estimating equation (41). The estimated co-
eﬃcients of the exporter and importer load ratios are both positive, fully consistent
with theory. The eﬀect of distance cannot be estimated signiﬁcantly in the pre-
ferred speciﬁcation, although it points in the right direction. Other speciﬁcations
suggests that the distance eﬀect is indeed positive as predicted.17 There is also a
16See Borenstein (2002) for a discussion of the factors that contributed to the California elec-
tricity crisis.
17The Technical Appendix contains a table with robustness checks where the distance eﬀect is
estimated signiﬁcantly with a positive sign when the importer dummies are excluded and only
36Table 9: Export Prices
Estimation Method OLS QREG OLS
Price Variable Mean Median Log
Intercept −13.01a (2.33) 0.564 (.120) 4.119c (70.2)
Load Ratio Exporter 30.014c (8.21) 26.005c (7.76)
Load Ratio Importer 53.108c (10.6) 45.318c (11.3)
Log Load Ratio Exporter 0.442c (9.30)
Log Load Ratio Importer 0.603c (10.5)
Log Distance 1.700 (.878) −2.004 (1.02) 0.051 (1.51)
M: Alaska 18.445c (3.60) 21.089c (3.73) 0.342c (3.85)
M: Arizona 25.117c (4.68) 24.129c (3.46) 0.501c (5.32)
M: California −1.960 (.388) 1.699 (.278) 0.030 (.347)
M: Colorado 11.645a (2.09) 10.706 (1.46) 0.225a (2.32)
M: Iowa −49.69a (2.40) −47.97 (.280) −1.342c (3.75)
M: Idaho 1.575 (.299) 3.327 (.551) 0.078 (.855)
M: Illinois 13.267b (3.08) 12.781b (3.00) 0.232b (3.12)
M: Indiana 16.728c (5.00) 14.544c (5.47) 0.271c (4.68)
M: Massachusetts 4.194 (1.47) 8.910a (2.15) 0.101a (2.06)
M: Maryland −106.0c (5.20) −103.5 (.467) −4.344c (12.3)
M: Maine 10.050c (3.56) 1.827 (.550) 0.233c (4.67)
M: Michigan 2.563 (1.25) 2.232 (1.31) 0.046 (1.28)
M: Minnesota −6.144a (2.09) −3.525 (1.43) −0.072 (1.45)
M: Missouri 9.955a (2.54) 6.102 (1.42) 0.131 (1.93)
M: Montana 18.391c (3.32) 13.247a (2.23) 0.403c (4.10)
M: North Dakota 25.681c (3.38) 23.826b (2.83) 0.608c (4.43)
M: Nebraska 30.907a (2.56) 36.731 (1.15) 0.390 (1.86)
M: New Hampshire 27.989c (8.87) 21.360c (6.56) 0.584c (9.87)
M: New Mexico 30.068c (5.55) 27.219c (4.64) 0.579c (6.11)
M: Nevada 17.495c (3.41) 17.985b (3.11) 0.336c (3.77)
M: Ohio 13.106b (3.18) 9.268c (3.50) 0.232b (3.25)
M: Oregon 7.006 (1.31) 2.316 (.385) 0.149 (1.62)
M: Pennsylvania 21.714c (8.06) 20.053c (9.44) 0.401c (8.58)
M: Texas 7.960 (1.70) 13.589b (2.85) 0.077 (.950)
M: Utah 32.609c (6.09) 29.505c (5.03) 0.616c (6.59)
M: Vermont 17.642c (8.48) 16.427c (8.50) 0.325c (9.07)
M: Washington 1.539 (.260) −4.882 (.697) 0.004 (.037)
M: Wyoming 48.936c (8.45) 43.063c (6.97) 1.061c (9.63)
X: Alberta 4.919 (.802) 9.378 (1.18) 0.058 (.547)
X: British Columbia 8.276 (1.68) 11.461 (1.85) 0.074 (.867)
X: Manitoba 3.876 (1.38) −0.503 (.242) 0.107a (2.17)
X: New Brunswick 32.359c (11.2) 36.406c (8.55) 0.599c (11.8)
X: Nova Scotia 12.513c (3.77) 16.004c (4.16) 0.176b (3.07)
X: Quebec 15.808c (10.3) 15.981c (10.1) 0.246c (9.29)
X: Saskatchewan 10.648 (1.45) 9.041 (1.07) 0.217 (1.71)
Time Trend −2.848c (25.2) −2.768c (23.3) −0.053c (26.7)
Observations 3,424 3,424 3,424
R2 0.331 0.367
Note: Regression methods are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and quantile
regressions for the median (QREG). Statistical signiﬁcance at the 95%,
99%, and 99.9% conﬁdence levels are indicated by superscripts a, b, c,
respectively. Standard scores (unsigned z-values) are shown in parenthe-
ses. The excluded groups for the export and importer jurisdiction indicator
variables are Ontario and New York. Importers are preﬁxed ‘M’; exporters
are preﬁxed ‘X.’
37negative time trend in the data. Electricity exports tend to get cheaper over time,
despite the rising cost of generation. Perhaps power markets in North America are
becoming more eﬃcient in dispatching electricity.
6. The Gains from Electricity Trade
Having laid out a new theory that leads to gains from trade, the obvious ques-
tion to ask is about the size of these gains from trade. Does ‘reciprocal load
smoothing’ generate economically meaningful welfare gains? Fundamentally,
these gains come from trading oﬀ generation capacity and transmission capacity.
Underinvestment in transmission capacity equals overinvestment in generation ca-
pacity, and this is economically ineﬃcient. Do potential welfare gains make a case
for pursuing policy changes towards building a North American ‘supergrid’?
The case for increased integration of the North American is gaining signiﬁcant
momentum (Bowman et al., 2009a,b; Carr, 2010; Goodman, 2010; Baker et al.,
2011; Bahar and Sauvage, 2013; Canadian Electricity Association, 2013). There
are many technical reasons that promote the notion of building a continent-wide
supergrid. Chief among them is the integration of renewable energy; see Am-
bec and Crampes (2012) and van Kooten et al. (2013) for a discussion of many
of the related issues. A supergrid may also provide greater reliability and redun-
dancy. There are numerous institutional issues and economic frictions that hold
back the construction of more transmission infrastructure. The most obvious is
the division of the North American transmission system into separate and mostly
self-contained interconnections: a world akin to free trade areas with high tariﬀ
walls between them. Neighbouring states cannot exploit trading opportunities if
they belong to diﬀerent interconnections, and more distant states cannot exploit
eﬃciencies from cross-continental delivery of power.
This section cannot provide a concise answer about the current and potential
gains from cross-border electricity trade. Many of the current gains are realized
at the sub-monthly level, and potential future gains from trade are contingent on
modeling increased transmission capacity. However, it is possible to sketch out
the economic extremes of a fully uniﬁed grid with pooled supply and zero trans-
mission cost, and an autarkic grid where each province or state is self-suﬃcient.18
In a fully integrated continental grid, local demand would be added up nationally
exporter dummies are used.
18A rigorous welfare analysis requires hourly mirco data and a sophisticated simulation-
optimization model in which additional long-distance bulk transmission capacity can be studied.
38and divided in proportion to generation capacity across states or provinces. This
would smooth the ups and downs in the capacity utilization because the uniﬁed
load would vary more smoothly than the sum of local variations—the familiar
portfolio eﬀect. With the covariances of demand σij and variance σii ≡ σ2
i, the
sum of standard deviations ¯ σ is larger than the pooled standard deviation ¯ ¯ σ when
demand is not perfectly correlated:
¯ σ ≡
X
i
σi >
sX
i
X
j
σij ≡ ¯ ¯ σ (42)
The diﬀerence in standard deviations ¯ σ− ¯ ¯ σ between unpooled and pooled portfo-
lio, multiplied by the desired safety margins ¯ m and ¯ ¯ m, identiﬁes the beneﬁt from
pooling. Thediﬀerencebetweenautarkyandfriction-lesspooledtradeis ¯ σ¯ m−¯ ¯ σ¯ ¯ m.
Table 10: Load Pooling in Canada (Monthly Scope)
Province Demand Std.Dv. Supply Surplus To U.S. Margin
Newfoundland 968 175 3,459 2,491 0 1.892
Prince Edward Is. 98 7 11 -87 0 2.208
Nova Scotia 998 134 983 -15 -8 2.106
New Brunswick 1,246 285 1,301 55 105 3.372
Quebec 17,015 2,718 15,536 -1,479 1,105 2.375
Ontario 11,924 1,341 12,551 627 472 2.212
Manitoba 1,931 323 2,700 769 678 2.489
Saskatchewan 1,682 216 1,681 -1 -15 4.799
Alberta 5,163 377 5,001 -161 -35 3.649
British Columbia 5,414 659 5,409 -5 -69 2.272
All Canada 46,440 6,236 48,633 2,193 2,234 2.566
(pooled) 5,062 2.272
Note: Analysis is based on 2003-2012 period using monthly data. All but the last columns
report ﬁgures in GWh per month. The column ‘Margin’ reports the diﬀerence between
maximum load and average load in units of standard deviations.
Table 10 backs out the pooling potential for Canada; for space considerations
the much longer table for the United States appears in the Technical Appendix.
For each province the table shows the average demand, standard deviation of
demand, supply (generation), and surplus. For example, during the 2003-2012
averaging period, the province of Newfoundland and Labrador generated an av-
39erage monthly surplus of 2.5 TWh. Quebec’s generation deﬁcit of 1.5 TWh was
balanced by importing electricity from Labrador, leaving roughly 1.1 TWh for ex-
port to the United States. Canada’s nation-wide surplus of 2.2 TWh was exported
to the United States. The last column shows the safety margin for each province,
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between maximum and average demand expressed in
standard deviations. For example, British Columbia’s required safety margin was
2.3 times its standard deviation of 659 GWh; these 1,497 GWh amount to 28% of
the province’s generating capacity.
The last two lines in table 10 identify the beneﬁts from a nationally pooled
grid. A pooled grid would reduce the standard deviation from ¯ σ=6,236 GWh to
¯ ¯ σ=5,062 GWh per month, a remarkable 19% drop. The pooled safety margin
is also a bit smaller than the weighted average of the individual safety margins.
The required contingent capacity is therefore 11.5 TWh instead of 16.0 TWh per
month. On a nationwide level, the 4.5 TWh/month diﬀerence is equivalent in size
to about seven modern nuclear reactors or a dozen large hydroelectric dams.19 But
just how much more trade—and intertie capacity—would a nationally-integrated
grid entail? Would the cost of building this intertie capacity come at a lower
cost than building seven nuclear reactors (about $50 billion) or a dozen new dams
(about $96 billion)?20 Of course, we are clearly not at the point of a fully autarkic
system as most jurisdictions indeed trade with one or more of their neighbouring
jurisdictions. On the other hand, the cost of building new transmission capacity
diminishes the potential for grid integration at the other end of the spectrum.
TheequivalentgainsfromgridintegrationaresigniﬁcantlylargerintheUnited
States. The pooled standard deviation of demand is 29,567 GWh, compared to
35,257 GWh unpooled. After applying the safety margins (2.286 pooled and
2.565 unpooled), the eﬃciency gap is 22.8 TWh/month in reduced contingent
capacity—the equivalent of 28 nuclear reactors or 65 Hoover dams! Of course,
the existing grid already realizes some of these gains. Careful analysis is needed
to quantify the remaining gap and the competing costs of building more trans-
mission capacity versus more generating capacity. The 22.8 TWh/month ﬁgure
underestimates the gains from trade because the available monthly data only cap-
tures seasonal eﬀects in the north-south direction. Over long distances, east-west
19Figures are based on the Westinghouse AP1000 design, rated at about 600 GWh/month, and
the Hoover dam, which generates about 350 GWh/month.
20This is based on projected costs for the Vogtle plant expansion in Georgia: $14 billion for
two AP 1000 reactors. By comparison, a new hydroelectric dam in British Columbia, Site C, is
expected to cost about $8 billion and is expected to generate 380 GWh/month.
40timezone shifts could provide signiﬁcant additional intra-day gains from trade.
A supergrid can provide several other economic and environmental beneﬁts.
In the long term, jurisdictions with a comparative advantage in electricity produc-
tion could build up generation capacity if they can deliver their electricity to more
distant markets. Renewable energy sources such as wind also require complemen-
tarities in generating capacity to make up for their intermittency. Hydro power
(which can accelerate or decelerate use of reservoirs) are a natural complement to
wind and solar energy. Greater integration can also improve overall system relia-
bility. More importantly, integration may also provide an opportunity for retiring
polluting generating capacity. The 22.8 TWh/month eﬃciency gap in the United
States translates into a signiﬁcant potential for climate change mitigation. At a
carbon dioxide intensity of about 1 tonne per MWh,21 an annual eﬃciency gap of
273 TWh translates into a potential for reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 273
million tonnes, or 5.2% of 2012’s annual total of 5.3 billion tonnes.
7. Conclusions
This paper has developed a theoretical model of two-way trade in electricity.
The set-up shares a common root in the trade-theoretical ‘reciprocal dumping’
model, which provided a foundation for two-way trade in identical commodities.
However, the underlying economic logic is fundamentally diﬀerent for electric-
ity trade. The ‘reciprocal dumping’ model relies on reciprocal market access of
oligopolistic competitors in two countries. While this model of two-way trade is
driven by market structure, the two-way trade in electricity is caused by stochas-
tic demand that shifts electricity generation up and down on an upward-sloping
marginal cost curve as electric utilities deploy their generation assets on a least-
cost-ﬁrst basis. Neighbouring jurisdictions engage in ‘reciprocal load smoothing.’
The theory developed in this paper has identiﬁed several key features of two-way
trade in electricity:
• Trade is one-way in the presence of strong (conventional) comparative ad-
vantage in electricity production, and trade tends to become more two-way
when comparative advantages between trading partners are more closely
matched.
21Source: Environmental Protection Agency. 2,249 lbs/MWh for coal-ﬁred power stations in
the United States.
41• Trade is two-way in the presence of ﬂuctuating demand where exports and
imports follow the load diﬀerence between two jurisdictions. Trading op-
portunities increase with the variability of electricity demand over time (due
to seasonal or intra-day eﬀects) and lower (or negative) correlation in de-
mand. Jurisdictional size diﬀerences also promote cross-border trade.
The empirical investigation of Canada-US cross-border trade in electricity lends
strong support to the theoretical model developed in this paper. Conventional
comparative advantage and reciprocal load smoothing work in tandem to explain
the observed patterns of cross-border trade in electricity.
Empirically, the volume of trade in electricity is subject to a much steeper de-
cline over distance than trade in merchandise goods. Whereas the distance elastic-
ity for the latter is typically around (negative) unity, it is roughly twice as high for
electricity. Doubling the distance reduces electricity trade by one-fourth. Perhaps
physical distance captures ‘jurisdictional’ distance: the legal and administrative
diﬃculties of building long-distance interties.
Whether the current level of electricity trade and continental integration of the
electricity grid is suﬃcient remains a rather important policy question. Rough
calculations of the trade potential—the diﬀerence between autarky and complete
frictionless integration—suggest an eﬃciency gap equivalent to 65 Hoover dams
in the United States and a dozen hydro dams in Canada. Even if only half or a
third of this eﬃciency gap remains to be closed, the potential gains from more
electricity trade across jurisdictions are impressive. With long-distance transmis-
sion costs falling through the development of high-voltage direct current (HVDC)
transmission lines, combined with the need to accommodate increasing volumes
of intermittent power from renewable sources, the quadrupling of cross-border
trade in electricity over the last decade (illustrated in ﬁgure 1) is making very
good economic sense.
The theory of ‘reciprocal load smoothing’ introduced in this paper constitutes
a new mechanism for gains from trade that may transcend electricity. In princi-
ple, the mechanism can apply to any homogenous product provided that there is
(a) non-perfect correlation in stochastic demand across trading partners and (b)
strongly upward-sloping marginal costs in production.
42Appendix A. Expectation of Quadratic Sum
Let f(x) be a normal probability density function of the random variable x
with mean µ and variance σ2. Then the expectation of a function g(x) is
E{g(x)} =
Z +∞
−∞
g(x)f(x)dx (A.1)
where f(x) = exp[−(x−µ)2/(2σ2)]/[σ
√
2π] is the normal density function. For a
quadratic function g(x) with arbitrary parameters a and b,
E{ax + bx
2} =
Z +∞
−∞
(ax + bx
2)f(x)dx = aµ + b(µ
2 + σ
2) (A.2)
Appendix B. Multivariate Normal Aﬃne Transformation
Assume the x is a vector of random variables which are distribute multi-
variate normal so that x ∼ N(µ,Σ). Further assume that b is a vector of con-
stants of the same size a x. The product z = b|x is then univariate normal with
z ∼ N(b|µ,b|Σb). Consider the bivariate case with vector elements +b1 and
−b2. Then z is distributed univariate normal with mean b1µ1 − b2µ2 and variance
b2
1σ2
1 + b2
2σ2
2 − 2b1b2ρσ1σ2. The variance will decrease if the two random vari-
ables are positively correlated, and will increase if the two random variables are
negatively correlated.
Appendix C. Truncated Normal Distribution
If a random variable z is distributed normally with mean µ and variance σ2,
then the expected values of the left-truncated and right-truncated distribution with
truncation point a are:
E{z|z > a} = µ + σ
φ((µ − a)/σ)
Φ((µ − a)/σ)
(C.1)
E{z|z < a} = µ − σ
φ((a − µ)/σ)
Φ((a − µ)/σ)
(C.2)
The functions φ(·) and Φ(·) denote the standard normal probability density func-
tion and standard normal probability cumulative density function, respectively.
Further note that φ(x) = φ(−x) and 1 − Φ(x) = Φ(−x).
43Appendix D. Alternative Cost Function
An alternative to the quadratic cost function that was used primarily in this
paper, it is possible to employ a logarithmic cost function
c(q) = −γln

1 −
q
K

(D.1)
that depends on the capacity utilization rate q/K. This cost function has a single
parameter γ > 0, and the cost function itself is convex with monotonically in-
creasing marginal cost, i.e., c0(q) = γ/(K − q) > 0 and c00(q) = γ/(K − q)2 > 0,
and limq→K c(q) = ∞. Instead of transmission costs, exporting incurs transmission
losses so that exporting the amount x requires x(1 + ξ) of extra generation, with
ξ > 0. Thus the proﬁt function can be written as
π
x = px −

C(q + x(1 + δ
xξ)) −C(q)

(D.2)
where δx and δm are binary indicators for export and import status, respectively.
The utility will export and import when
p >
γ(1 + ξ)
K − q
for exporting (D.3)
p <
γ
K − q
for importing (D.4)
The trading price for electricity is
p =
(1 + ξ)(γh + γf)
(K f − qf)(1 + δxξ) + (Kh − qh)(1 + δmξ)
(D.5)
and the export volume is
x
h =
γf(Kh − qh)
(γh + γf)(1 + δxξ)
−
γh(K f − qf)
(γh + γf)(1 + δmξ)
(D.6)
Exports and imports will occur when
ξ <
γf(Kh − qh)
γh(K f − qf)
for exporting (D.7)
ξ <
γh(K f − qf)
γf(Kh − qh)
for importing (D.8)
44From the above it is clear that xh is a linear function of qh and qf, and thus the
integration over the reference time period to ﬁnd Xh and Mh proceeds in the same
fashion as discussed in the paper and Appendix B and Appendix C.
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